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when only individuals are considered who started their labor market career in the market 
economy and they hold across skill groups. 
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1.   Introduction  
  Much interest focuses on the adjustment of transition economies' wage structures on 
the path to market oriented economies. Numerous contributions investigate the development 
of returns to human capital in transition economies and test whether the abolition of wage 
grids and socialist wage compression has lead to more dispersed wages and to increases in 
the returns to human capital (see e.g. Andrén et al. 2005, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova 
Peter 2005, Flanagan 1998, Boeri and Flinn 1999, or Liu 2006). In their meta-analysis of this 
literature Fleisher et al. (2005) present a record of rising returns to education throughout.  
  However, the focus on the rising returns to education might be misleading if at the 
same time wages remained irresponsive to other dimensions of human capital. Interestingly, 
only a handful of studies in this literature investigate the development of returns to tenure and 
experience. Among them are Jones and Ilayperuma Simon (2005) who take advantage of 
Bulgarian employer-employee data. They find that returns to education about doubled after 
transition while returns to experience stayed constant at low levels. Münich et al. (2005) look 
at the development of the Czech wage structure and confirm a dramatic increase in the 
returns to education, yet no shift in the returns to experience at the end of the communist 
regime. Noorkoiv et al. (1997) study the case of Estonia where returns to schooling increased 
sharply between 1989 and 1995 whereas the age-earnings profile flattened. 
  A possible explanation for the different developments in the returns to human capital 
inherent in schooling and in labor market experience might be related to the specific 
adjustments coinciding with economic transition. If schooling were a valid signal for innate 
individual productivity it could be remunerated immediately. Socialist labor market 
experience, however, may have been only of limited value such that it took time for labor 
market experience in the market economy to accumulate value. This might explain why the 
adjustment in returns to experience lags behind the adjustment in returns to education.   2
  In this study we compare the East and West German wage structures almost two 
decades after unification in order to investigate whether systematic differences in the returns 
to experience and tenure in the two regional labor markets have disappeared over time. In 
1990 East and West Germany became one country, sharing since not only history and 
language but also labor market institutions. Much has been written about the transition 
process in East Germany and optimistic studies from the early 1990s have been replaced by 
more somber assessments.
1  
  This study contributes to the literature in various ways: first, in contrast to most 
analyses which study labor market adjustments of former socialist countries on their way 
market oriented economies, in the case of Germany we can take advantage of a benchmark 
economy. East Germany is adjusting to an institutional setting which at the same time and 
identically determines West German labor market outcomes. This allows us to identify the 
consequences of a socialist heritage in a comparative perspective, which is not available for 
other countries. Second, we improve on the least squares approach which predominates in 
studies of wage structures in transition economies and account for the endogeneity of tenure 
and experience. We apply the more advanced estimators of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and 
Topel (1991). Estimates based on these procedures at times differ vastly from the biased least 
squares results. Third, we apply recent and representative panel data evidence on life-cycle 
wage structures. Finally, since Görzig et al. (2008) point to shifts in the sectoral and 
occupational employment structure as the main determinant of differences in wage levels in 
East and West Germany, we carefully control for such composition effects.  
  Our results are of immediate policy relevance: German active labor market policies 
spent large amounts to create public employment opportunities for the East German labor 
force (for a survey see Fertig et al. 2006). If there are no or only low returns to experience 
                                                 
1 For recent contributions see Snower and Merkl (2006) or Uhlig (2006, 2008). For accounts of 
German unification and its labor market aspects see e.g. Steiner and Bellman (1995), Burda and 
Schmidt (1997), Franz and Steiner (2000), Burda and Hunt (2001), Hunt (2001), Spitz-Oener (2007), 
or Burda (2006, 2008).  3
then the payoff of expensive public employment is much lower than expected. In addition, 
prior analyses of transition economies' labor market adjustments may have been too 
optimistic when they built their conclusions on the increasing returns to schooling only. 
Taking returns to experience and tenure into account the transition processes in labor markets 
may be much slower than assumed so far.  
  In the East German labor market immediately prior to unification returns to 
experience and tenure were half those earned in West Germany (Bird et al. 1994) and life 
cycle wage heterogeneity was much below West German levels (Krueger and Pischke 1995). 
Burda and Schmidt (1997, p.195) studied the early adjustment process of wages in East 
Germany through 1993 and concluded that "returns to age were depressed under socialism 
and continue to be so several years after market relations were introduced." Jurajda and 
Harmgart (2007) find that in 1995 the experience profile was considerably flatter in East than 
in the West Germany. Based on data through 1997, Franz and Steiner (2000, p.260) find that 
in the East German private sector "wages do not increase with general labor market 
experience (…)". Gathmann (2005) added a new perspective to the debate by comparing the 
ratio of East to West German wages separately by age group and over time. She found that 
the relative wage difference was largest for older, i.e. more experienced workers throughout 
the first ten years after unification. This suggests that even ten years after unification the flat 
wage experience profile of the socialist economy had not disappeared.  
  We apply data from the 2002-2006 surveys of the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(SOEP Group, 2001) on East and West German wage structures. We provide evidence on 
returns to tenure and experience and investigate whether socialist labor market institutions 
continue to characterize East German wages. Numerous commentators interpreted the 
previously observed lack of returns to experience in East Germany as a consequence of the 
obsolescence of general human capital following reunification. We test whether these 
findings are due to a cohort effect that disappears when only those cohorts are considered  4
who entered the labor market after 1990. As wage structures are generally heterogeneous 
across skill groups we additionally study East and West German life cycle wages by skill 
group. 
  Our key results are that the returns to tenure are small but similar in East and West 
Germany, while the experience profiles still differ substantially even after controlling for 
potential composition effects. We discuss possible interpretations of this evidence, which 
suggests that it takes at least one generation to leave the socialist heritage behind.  
 
2.   Estimation Approach 
  The key challenge in identifying the causal returns to tenure and experience in a wage 
model is to account for the potential endogeneity of the measures of human capital. This 
problem has been neglected in the transition economics literature on the development of 
wage structures so far. Let for person i in employment j at period t   
       W ijt = b1 Tijt + b2 Eijt + eijt   ,          (1) 
where W represents the log real hourly wage, T and E represent (polynomials of) tenure and 
experience. Other control variables may enter (1) but are ignored here for ease of exposition. 
bk are coefficients to be estimated. eijt is the error term, which is assumed to combine fixed 
individual effects (ei), fixed job match effects (eij), and a random term ηijt 
       e ijt = ei + eij + ηijt  .       ( 2 )  
There are several reasons why T or E may be correlated with components of the error term, 
which unless accounted for causes biased and inconsistent least squares estimates of the 
return parameters bk: tenure may be correlated with ei if person-specific characteristics affect 
the stability of employment relationships as well as wages. Also, job match-specific 
unobservables eij are likely to affect the probability of quits and thereby of observed tenure. 
In addition, we observe only those selected new employment relationships which improve  5
individual outcomes. An overall positive correlation between tenure and the unobservables 
would lead to an overestimation of the least squares coefficient.  
  Experience may be correlated with eijt as matching and job search processes increase 
the probabilities of a good match the longer an individual is active on the labor market. This 
may generate a positive correlation between experience and the match specific error 
component eij. If individuals with specific unobserved characteristics such as motivation 
spend more time in the labor market, this correlation between experience and ei may yield an 
overestimate of the returns to experience.  
  Two classic approaches to deal with these potential endogeneities are suggested by 
Altonji and Shakotko (AS, 1987) and Topel (1991). AS address the endogeneity of tenure 
using an instrumental variables approach. They instrument all tenure indicators based on the 
difference between the period-specific and the average value  ij T  for a given job match j of 
person i:
2 
        ij ijt ijt T T T
~
− =     .        (3) 
This instrument is correlated with T and uncorrelated with person- and match-specific 
unobservables thus solving the endogeneity problem.
3 The endogeneity of experience both 
with respect to ei and eij is not accounted for in this approach, which is why b2 may be biased 
upward. Since tenure and experience are generally positively correlated overestimated returns 
to experience generate underestimated returns to tenure. 
  As a second estimator, we apply Topel's (1991) two-step procedure: step one 
estimates average within-job annual wage growth for individuals who did not change jobs. 
                                                 
2 There may be more than one tenure indicator due to higher order polynomial and interaction terms. 
3 Dustmann and Pereira (2008) discuss an alternative approach introduced by Finnie (1999), which 
corrects only for the correlation between tenure and person-specific error terms. Their estimates for 
West German data show that the returns to tenure based on this approach (which uses the difference 
between Tijt and the average of Ti) are between those generated by OLS and AS.  6
This allows identification of the sum of the returns to seniority (b1) and to experience (b2) in 
the constant term, because )T = )E = 1
4 and in the simple linear representation
5 
      W ijt - Wijt-1 = (b1 + b2) + eijt - eijt -1         (4) 
Step two then investigates the earnings of workers who started new jobs. As they have not yet 
accumulated seniority a cross-sectional estimation of the returns to experience of individuals 
with zero tenure identifies their returns to general labor market experience: 
       W ijt = b2 Eij0 + eijt   ,       ( 5 )  
Here Eij0 reflects the initial experience of workers starting a new job. The returns to seniority 
are then approximated as the difference in the returns found in steps one and two of the 
analysis.  
  To obtain these estimates the literature proceeds by rewriting total experience as the 
sum of initial experience on the new job and current tenure,  
       E ijt = Eij0 + Tijt,        ( 6 )  
which then generates the following wage equation 
       W ijt = (b1 + b2)Tijt + b2 Eij0 + eijt .      (7) 
The second step regression thus uses  
      W ijt - Tijt b* = b2 Eij0 + eijt   ,         ( 8 )     
where b* is the estimated value of (b1 + b2) from step 1 (see equation 4). We follow this 
approach and additionally consider changes in a large set of control variables when 
estimating b*.  
  Unbiased estimators result only if the groups of individuals who did not change jobs 
and those who started a new job are randomly selected and if their characteristics are not 
correlated with the unobservables. Since this is unlikely to be the case, Topel (1991) 
                                                 
4 With strictly annual data the differences in tenure and experience values from year to year are 
exactly equal to one. In our data interview dates vary. However we are able to take advantage of 
precise information and can minimize measurement error by considering the actually observed change 
in tenure and experience when estimating (b1 + b2). 
5 The procedure generalizes to a non-linear specification. We applied second and third order 
polynomials in tenure and experience.  7
interprets his estimate of b2 as an upper bound such that the resulting estimate of b1 is a lower 
bound of the returns to seniority. While both, the AS and the Topel estimators rely on 
restrictive assumptions, both improve on the least squares approach to estimate the returns to 
tenure and experience and are frequently applied in this literature (see e.g. Parent 2000, 
Luchsinger et al. 2003, or Dustmann and Pereira 2008).  
 
3.   Data 
  We use the 2002-2006 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP Group 
2001), a representative panel on German households. We consider full-time employed males, 
aged 25-60, who are not self-employed, not in vocational training, not in marginal jobs and 
who work in the private sector.
6 Our West and East German samples contain 2,603 and 738 
individuals and 10,087 and 2,746 person-year observations, respectively.  
  Since there were some missing values in the observed gross wage, hours, and 
education measures we generated ten complete multiply imputed datasets which we use for 
all analyses. The imputation procedure fills missing values of certain variables in several 
steps. First, a value is drawn randomly out of the distribution of observed values. Then the 
random draw is replaced by predicted values which are obtained successively in twenty 
iteration steps. The process is repeated ten times with different random draws of the starting 
values and generates ten complete datasets without missing values. All ten are used in the 
analysis and inference procedures are adjusted following Rubin's rule (Rubin 1987 and Little 
and Rubin 1987).  
  The dependent variable measures log hourly wages in 2002 Euros. Wages are 
calculated based on current gross monthly incomes, which we divided by hours worked in the 
month of the interview. We apply current working hours because monthly income includes 
                                                 
6 In future work we will investigate the determinants of the wage structure of female workers. 
Females, who make up the smaller part of the private sector work force are omitted here in order to 
generate a homogeneous sample and to avoid sample selection issues.  8
overtime pay and thus likely varies with the actual number of hours worked.
7 This allows for 
more precise measurement compared to studies based e.g. on the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) which only measures annual incomes or based on German unemployment 
insurance data which generate daily rather than hourly wages. Figure 1 characterizes the age-
earnings profiles observed for the two groups. It immediately suggests that the regional 
difference is not only one of levels but also of life-cycle patterns. Figure 2a presents the life 
cycle wage structures for medium skill (with completed vocational education) and high skill 
groups (with completed tertiary education). It confirms the difference in wage levels across 
age groups for the two regions. To focus on the difference in the slopes of wage profiles 
Figure 2b depicts life cycle wages relative to the wage level obtained by the youngest age 
group, again separately for both regions and skill groups. The difference in relative wage 
increases between the two regions appears to beginning with the age group of the 35-39 year 
olds. This might suggest that there is a cohort effect at work, which causes different 
valuations for labor force participation experience under the communist and the market 
oriented regimes. This hypothesis is tested below. 
  Our key explanatory variables are tenure and experience. Tenure measures the time 
spent with the current employer over all possible jobs at the monthly level. Experience 
similarly measures the sum of total full-time and part-time work experience.
8 Both, tenure 
and experience are measured at the same time as the wage, i.e. at the time of the interview. 
To obtain the initial experience at the start of a job we calculated the difference between 
current experience and tenure: cases where the difference was smaller than minus two years 
                                                 
7 Only if the respondent did not provide the number of current hours worked the contractual working 
hours were applied. 
8 Recent studies (e.g. Parent 2000) consider industry-specific experience. In our case it could be 
interesting to separately control for East or West German experience. Unfortunately, our data do not 
provide information at this level of detail.  9
were dropped.
9 Since the data does not inform on the date of job terminations, the exact value 
of initial work experience when taking on a new job cannot be determined.
10 Since only those 
individuals can be considered in the Topel estimator which are observed in at least two 
subsequent periods, we censor observations in the first year of missing data (e.g. due to panel 
attrition). 
  Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of tenure and experience outcomes in East and 
West Germany: the share of East German employees with tenure values above 15 years is 
visibly smaller than in the West. This is exactly the pattern we would expect as a 
consequence of German unification and economic shifts starting in 1989. We find a 
somewhat lower share of workers with many years of work experience in the East, which is 
likely to be a consequence of intensive early retirement programs initiated at unification.   
  Our specification of the wage model considers cubic terms in both tenure and 
experience, a set of 6 indicators of highest educational attainment, immigrant status, federal 
state of residence (9 for West and 6 for East Germany), 12 industry indicators as well as 
calendar year fixed effects. The variables are described in Table 1 by subsample.  
 
4.   Results  
4.1 Main  Results 
  We start our analysis replicating prior studies and providing least squares results of 
the log wage equations, separately for East and West Germany in Table 2. For both regions 
the third order polynomials in tenure and experience were jointly highly statistically 
                                                 
9  This affected about 4.5 percent of our observations. In addition, in cases where the measured 
experience was slightly smaller than tenure, initial experience was replaced by the value of tenure and 
then updated based on subsequent observations. 
10  We added half of the uncertain period as additional experience and considered the other half as 
unemployment. If e.g. a person started a new job in October and was employed on the old job in 
March the termination date of the old job could be at any point between March and October. We 
added half of this uncertain period (three of the six months from April to September) to the prior 
experience value, on average 2 months. This uncertainty affected about 5 percent of all person-year 
observations.  10
significant mostly at the one percent level. We applied these estimates to predict the wage 
effects of ten years tenure and experience (see columns 1 and 4 in Table 3). A comparison of 
the predicted effects yields very similar correlations between seniority and wages in East and 
West Germany: staying with the same employer for ten years is associated with 14 percent 
higher wages based on the OLS coefficients in both regions. The predicted returns to 
experience are somewhat larger in West Germany. The standard errors are generated by 
block-bootstrap of the observations in the unbalanced panel for each of the multiply imputed 
datasets (e.g. Rubin 1987, Rubin and Little 1987). We tested the hypothesis that the OLS 
parameter estimates of tenure and experience differ significantly between East and West 
Germany. These tests yield similar returns to tenure but significantly different returns to 
experience in a fully interacted model. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot the 
impact of experience on predicted wages in East and West Germany.
11 The resulting patterns 
differ substantially. In addition, we tested whether the predicted effects of tenure and 
experience in Table 3 are identical in East and West Germany. The hypothesis is rejected at 
the 10 percent significance level for the highest experience values. 
  Since these results suffer from the correlation between covariates and error terms we 
applied the more advanced approaches by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) to 
estimate the returns to tenure and experience using the same specification as in Table 2. The 
predicted impact of the first 5 and 10 years of tenure and experience using both estimators are 
described in the remaining columns in Table 3 separately for the two regions. Overall, the 
results confirm expectations. As in much of this literature we obtain for both regions vastly 
reduced returns to tenure when the AS estimator is applied, in fact they turn even negative for 
East Germany. The predictions are not significantly different from zero.
12 The returns to 
                                                 
11 We consider a person with five years tenure, born in Germany, observed in 2006, employed in the 
energy sector with intermediate education, and residing either in Saxony or North-Rhine Westphalia. 
12 In their analysis for Switzerland Luchsinger et al. (2003) similarly observed a drop from significant 
7.5 percent wage increase with ten years of tenure based on OLS to an insignificant 1.7 percent when  11
experience obtained with the AS estimator are very similar to the least squares results in both 
cases, again showing higher returns to experience in West Germany. The plot of the impact 
of experience on predicted wages in Figure 4 yields a somewhat dampened curvature 
compared to the least squares results. 
  Next, we apply the Topel estimator which identifies the causal returns to tenure and 
experience if job changes are exogenous (columns 3 and 6 in Table 3).
13 The resulting returns 
to tenure lie between the OLS and AS results but are hardly significant. We find a value of 7 
percent return to ten years of tenure for West and twice this rate, 13.8 percent for East 
Germany. The returns to experience for the West German sample are significantly different 
from zero throughout and much above the levels obtained for East Germany: while ten years 
of work experience in West Germany yield a return of 44 percent, they increase East German 
wages only by 22 percent. Thus, even 20 years after reunification the life cycle earnings 
patterns are still substantially flatter in East than West Germany. 
    
4.2 Robustness  Tests 
  We complemented the above analyses by two immediate tests. First, we repeated all 
analyses after adding six categorical firm size indicators to the specification. Even though the 
firm size effects were jointly significant in almost all estimations they did not affect the 
predicted returns to tenure and experience. Second, we evaluated whether the results for East 
Germany in Table 3 are sensitive to controlling for third order polynomials. Since the sample 
size is small this might have caused some overfitting. We redid the analysis for East Germany 
using only second order polynomials and obtained returns to experience that were even 
smaller than those presented in Table 3.  
                                                                                                                                                        
they applied the AS estimator. Dustmann and Pereira (2008) find a drop from a significant 12.8 
percent to a small negative value for West German data from 1984-1999, as well. 
13 The results of the first and second step Topel estimation for the West German case are provided in 
Appendix Table 1.  12
  In a first robustness test we repeated our analyses separately for individuals of 
different skill groups. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) found for West Germany, that skilled 
workers benefited much more from general labor market experience than unskilled workers. 
So, if the average worker in East Germany was less skilled than his West German colleague 
this might have caused the observation of different returns to experience. 
  We estimated separate models for workers in three skill categories. The skill groups 
are defined following the literature:
14 workers without a vocational education (e.g. without an 
apprenticeship) are considered as low skill workers. We observe 5 and 13 percent of our East 
and West German samples in that group. Medium skill workers are those who completed a 
vocational degree (more than 72 and 64 percent of the East and West German samples, 
respectively) and high skill workers are those who hold a tertiary education degree, which is 
observed for about 22 percent in both regions. The mere skill distribution in the two regional 
subsamples does not seem to support the skill based explanation of differences in life-cycle 
wage structures. 
  The predicted returns to experience and tenure for medium and high skill groups are 
presented in Table 4. In contrast to Dustmann and Pereira (2008) who added skill interaction 
terms to their specification we estimated separate equations for the different skill groups to 
flexibly account for potential differences in composition effects across skill groups. We do 
not present the results for low skill workers because they are based on very small samples 
which do not yield informative results. For the other skill groups the returns to tenure are 
somewhat mixed. Returns to tenure in the East exceed those in the West, in the West they are 
higher for medium skill workers, in the East they are higher for high skill workers. Even 
when we sort the sample by skill group we find significantly lower returns to experience in 
the East than in the West for all subgroups. In addition, the returns to experience are higher 
for those with high than with medium skills. Generally, the higher returns to experience in 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Dustmann and Pereira (2008), or Fitzenberger (1999).  13
West Germany appear to be driven by high skill workers, whose relative wage gains due to 
experience are about twice as high as those observed for medium skill workers. 
 
  As a further test of whether the results presented above are indicative of a different 
wage structure in the two German regions we repeated the analysis considering only workers 
born 1970 or later. These individuals' labor market history should not be affected by personal 
employment experience under the East German socialist regime. If we find subdued returns 
to experience even for them it suggests ongoing differences in the earnings structures rather 
than cohort effects. We applied the same estimation and prediction procedure as described 
above, only now omitting cubic tenure and experience terms from the specification to avoid 
overfitting.
15 The results are presented in Table 5. Our main conclusions hold up when the 
younger sample is considered: under least squares the returns to tenure are similar across 
regions, and the returns to experience are significantly higher in the West. Under the AS 
estimator the returns to tenure diminish. The predictions based on the Topel procedure yield 
larger returns to tenure in the East and substantially larger returns to experience in the West. 
This suggests that the different returns to experience are not due to cohort effects but instead 
to systematic regional wage-structure differences.  
 
4.3 Aggregate  Wage  Trends 
  One might argue that with respect to the development of individual earnings low 
returns to work experience can be complemented and balanced by high overall real wage 
increases over time. Thus if general wage trends have steeper slopes in East Germany than in 
the West the impact of lower returns to experience were ameliorated. 
  As our estimations control for the overall development in real wages we can inspect 
the evidence on this point. The year indicators in the least squares estimates in Table 2 
                                                 
15 For this sample we observed mean values of tenure of 4.2 years in the East and 4.7 years in the 
West. Mean experience amounted to 7.6 years in the East and 8.3 years in the West.   14
illustrate ceteris paribus real average wage increases between 2002 and 2006 of 6.4 percent in 
West and 7.8 percent in East Germany, which implies annual increases of about 1.6 and 1.9 
percent. While eastern wages generally grow somewhat faster this cannot balance the lower 
returns to experience of about 20 percentage points in ten years (c.f. Tables 3 and 5).  
  When we compare the aggregate wage trends across skill groups, we find larger wage 
increases in the regressions for high skilled than for medium or low skilled workers. While 
this differs from Dustmann and Pereira's (2008) finding for the 1990s it agrees well with the 
overall widening of the income distribution in recent years (Dustmann et al. 2007).  
  Thus, overall secular wage growth is somewhat larger in East than in West Germany. 
Yet in the individual life cycle this effect is too small to make up for subdued returns to 
experience in East Germany.  
  
5.   Conclusions 
  The literature on the adjustment of wage structures in transition economies suffers 
from two major shortcomings: first, it concentrates almost exclusively on the returns to 
schooling and disregards the life-cycle perspective of wage structures. Second, it generally 
relies on least squares estimation which does not account for important biases in the 
estimation of wage determinants.  
  This paper contributes to that literature by studying the returns to tenure and 
experience based on more appropriate estimators. We analyze the wage structure of a 
transition economy and compare the East German life-cycle wage patterns with those in West 
Germany, a region with the same institutional framework but no heritage of a centrally 
planned economy. Previous studies found flat age-earnings profiles in East Germany 
immediately after unification in the early 1990s. Our data allow us to investigate the patterns 
between 2002 and 2006, almost two decades after the fall of the iron curtain.    15
  Our results confirm that not much has changed since the early 1990s. The wage-
experience profile in East Germany is substantially flatter than in the West. To test whether 
this is driven by different skill compositions among East and West German workers we 
separately estimate the returns to human capital by skill level. However, returns to experience 
are much lower for East than West German workers across all skill groups. Alternatively, the 
low returns to experience might be due to a cohort effect and determined by those workers 
whose experience became obsolete at the economic transition and who may be more likely to 
be employed in positions that do not match their - at times outdated - qualifications. We 
estimate our models separately only for those younger birth cohorts who gathered their entire 
labor market experience after unification. However, even for these individuals we find 
significantly lower returns to experience in East than in West Germany.  
  This opens the intriguing research question of why the returns to human capital differ 
systematically and significantly between the two regions, even after controlling for 
composition effects related to education, industry, firm size, and region. In a recent 
contribution Fuchs-Schündeln and Izem (2008) emphasize that productivity differentials 
between East and West Germany are not due to worker characteristics but instead must be 
explained by differences in firm characteristics, regional public policy, or the cooperation 
between firms (see also Uhlig 2006 and 2008). This finding corroborates our conclusion that 
there are indeed systematic regional - rather than individual - differences between East and 
West Germany affecting the wage structure. In future research we plan to consider the 
following possible explanations: (i) the wage structure might be the result of selective 
emigration from East Germany, if only those with the least life-cycle productivity growth 
stayed (Hunt 2006). This possibility contradicts the conclusion of Fuchs-Schündeln and Izem 
(2008) yet in the face of continuing emigration from East Germany it deserves attention. (ii) 
Possibly, continued education activities are predominantly used in West Germany. In that 
case different life-cycle wage developments reflect systematically different additions to  16
productivity over time, which might be complemented by different deferred compensation 
patterns in the two regions. (iii) Employees in the two regions might be differently affected 
by collective bargaining. We know that East German employers are less likely to be a 
member in employer associations (Kohaut and Schnabel 2003). This could explain the 
observed results if the union-contracts tend to prescribe age-based wage structures. (iv) 
Finally, independent of institutional differences in the collective bargaining frameworks, life-
cycle wage structures might be affected by differences in the negotiating power of older 
workers in East and West Germany. One way to learn about any such differences could be to 
compare wage curves in East and West Germany by age group. Buscher (2003) finds 
unusually high wage elasticities in East Germany overall. It would be interesting to compare 
this evidence for different age groups and to test the hypothesis of monopsonistic labor 
markets for older employees in East Germany. 
  This research yields three conclusions. First, even today East German workers could 
on average gain substantially over the life-cycle by moving West. Second, there seems to be 
little benefit to using public funds to keep otherwise unemployed East German workers in 
subsidized employment, as the East German labor market does not seem to reward work 
experience. Third, studies which celebrate the arrival of market economies based on an 
analysis of returns to schooling alone might be jumping too short. Based on a comparison 
with the West German benchmark we find evidence for substantially subdued life-cycle wage 
structures in the transition economy of East Germany, even close to twenty years after 
unification and even for those workers who entered the labor force after unification. 
Therefore the transition process might be much more protracted than had been assumed so far 
and - to the extent that returns to tenure and experience reflect real productivity differentials - 
the productivity gap between economic systems may have been larger than assumed so far.   17
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Note: Real hourly wages are deflated to 2002 prices. Estimates were obtained by regressing 
real log hourly wages on a set of indicator variables for age group and year. The dashed lines 
are pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals obtained from least squares standard errors 
adjusted for multiple imputation. 
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  21
 Figure 2  Life Cycle Wage Structure by Region and Skill Group: Log-Level and  
    Groupwise Indexed to wages of age group 25-29 
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Note:   Skill stands for workers with completed vocational training, high skill represents 
those with completed tertiary degree. The wage development of workers without vocational 
training is not presented because of small sample sizes. 
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  22
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Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  23
Figure 4  Estimated Polynomials in Experience in East and West based on Least  
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Note: The wages were predicted for individuals with five years tenure, born in Germany, 
observed in 2006, employed in the energy sector with intermediate education, and residing 
either in Saxony or NRW. The predictions are based on the OLS and AS estimates.  24
Table 1 Descriptive  Statistics 
 
 
 West  Germany 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
East Germany 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Dependent Variable     
  log real hourly wage  2.82 (.0013)  2.41 (.0026) 
Explanatory Variables     
  Tenure  10.79 (.0275)  8.26 (.0423) 
  Experience  19.73 (.0301)  20.36 (.0561) 
  Education: Lower Secondary School  .3934 (.0015)  .1400 (.0021) 
  Education: Intermediate Sec. School  .2034 (.0013)  .5609 (.0030) 
  Education: Upper Secondary  .0850 (.0009)  .0470 (.0013) 
  Education: University, Technical College  .2224 (.0013)  .2345 (.0026) 
  Education: Other / Missing  .0958 (.0009)  .0175 (.0008) 
  State: Schleswig-Holstein  .0310 (.0005)  - 
  State: Hamburg  .0170 (.0004)  - 
  State: Lower Saxony  .1015 (.0010)  - 
  State: Bremen  .0074 (.0003)  - 
  State: North Rhine-Westphalia  .2779 (.0014)  - 
  State: Hesse  .0919 (.0009)  - 
  State: Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland  .0803 (.0009)  - 
  State: Baden-Württemberg  .1957 (.0012)  - 
  State: Bavaria  .1974 (.0013)  - 
  State: Berlin  -  .1211 (.0020) 
  State: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  -  .0786 (.0016) 
  State: Brandenburg  -  .1375 (.0021) 
  State: Saxony-Anhalt  -  .1772 (.0023) 
  State: Thuringia  -  .1887 (.0024) 
  State: Saxony  -  .2969 (.0028) 
  Born in Germany  .8268 (.0012)  .9800 (.0008) 
  Industry: Not Applicable  .0102 (.0003)  .0288 (.0010) 
  Industry: Agriculture  .0438 (.0006)  .0438 (.0012) 
  Industry: Energy  .2945 (.0014)  .2068 (.0024) 
  Industry: Mining  .1524 (.0011)  .1156 (.0019) 
  Industry: Manufacturing  .1019 (.0010)  .1662 (.0022) 
  Industry: Construction  .1120 (.0010)  .1344 (.0021) 
  Industry: Trade  .0988 (.0009)  .0758 (.0016) 
  Industry: Transport  .0872 (.0009)  .0971 (.0018) 
  Industry: Bank, Insurance  .0207 (.0004)  .0387 (.0012) 
  Industry: Services  .0455 (.0007)  .0488 (.0013) 
  Industry: Other  .0025 (.0002)  .0022 (.0003) 
  Industry: Missing  .0306 (.0005)  .0418 (.0012) 
Number of person-year observations   10,087  2,746 
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  25
















Educ: Intermediate .1272*** .0143
[.0162] [.0391]
Educ: Upper secondary .2837*** .2008***
[.0236] [.0750]
Educ: Univ., techn. College .5017*** .3952***
[.0168] [.0462]
Educ: Other / Missing .0156 -.0787
[.0211] [.1278]












State of Residence yes yes
Industry yes yes
Observations 10,087 2,746




(a) ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.  
(b) The coefficients of the indicators for state of residence, industry, and calendar year are not 
presented to save space. Standard errors are calculated based on Rubin's Rule for multiply 
imputed data using Stata's micombine command.  
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  26
Table 3  Predicted Returns to Tenure and Experience in East and West Germany with 
    Alternative Estimators – Full Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS AS Topel OLS AS Topel
5 vs 0 yrs Tenure .0767 *** -.0079 .0452 * .0697 ** -.0298 .0497
(.0150) (.0178) (.0243) (.0312) (.0282) (.0493)
10 vs 0 yrs Tenure .1413 *** .0055 .0704 .1390 *** -.0639 .1378
(.0204) (.0307) (.0493) (.0419) (.0513) (.0933)
5 vs 0 yrs Experience .2002 *** .1993 *** .2249 *** .1719 *** .1631 ** .1424 *
(.0237) (.0281) (.0433) (.0551) (.0725) (.0830)
10 vs 0 yrs Experience .3273 *** .3353 *** .4372 *** .2576 *** .2709 .2175
(.0353) (.0450) (.0868) (.0822) (.3003) (.1669)
20 vs 0 yrs Experience .4223 *** .4639 *** .8301 *** .2576 *** .3666 .2871
(.0381) (.0615) (.1804) (.0868) (.2338) (.3478)
West Germany East Germany
 
Notes:   
(a) ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.  
(b) Shaded cells indicate a significant difference in the predicted wage effects between East 
and West Germany at least at the 10 percent level. Assuming no correlation between the 
predicted wage effects, the z-test statistic divides the difference in predicted wage values 
(DW) by the square root of the sum of their variances:  
  Z   =   ( D W West – DWeast) / [var(DWWest) + var(DWWest)]
0.5 
(c) The standard errors were obtained via block-bootstrap using 100 replications based on ten 
multiply imputed data sets.  
(d) The underlying regression models are specified as in Table 2. 
(e) The OLS and AS returns were predicted based on regressions with 10,087 person-year 
observations for West and 2,746 person-year observations for the East German sample. The 
first step of the Topel-estimator used 2,509 and 698 observations, the second step is based on 
616 and 214 observations in East and West Germany, respectively.  
(f) The last row with predictions for 20 versus 0 years of experience certainly contains out of 
sample predictions.  
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations. 
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Table 4  Returns to Tenure and Experience in East and West Germany according to 
    Alternative Estimators – By Skill Group 
 
(a) Medium Skilled (Person-Year Observations West: 6508, East: 1953) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS AS Topel OLS AS Topel
5 vs 0 yrs Tenure .0829 *** -.0125 .0424 * .0873 *** -.0213 .1125 ***
(.0105) (.0236) (.0243) (.0252) (.0341) (.0393)
10 vs 0 yrs Tenure .1501 *** -.0143 .0936 ** .1585 *** -.0526 .1959 ***
(.0180) (.0452) (.0422) (.0433) (.0640) (.0652)
5 vs 0 yrs Experience .0917 *** .1399 ** .1514 *** .0360 .1533 .0440
(.0148) (.0707) (.0305) (.0262) (.1321) (.0473)
10 vs 0 yrs Experience .1673 *** .2650 * .2926 *** .0608 .2814 .0983
(.0260) (.1402) (.0611) (.0459) (.2628) (.0946)
20 vs 0 yrs Experience .2698 *** .4710 .5443 *** .0768 .4620 .2371
(.0391) (.2779) (.1270) (.0666) (.5224) (.1952)
West Germany East Germany
 
(b) Highly Skilled (Person-Year Observations West: 2244, East: 643) 
 
5 vs 0 yrs Tenure .0258 -.0255 .0130 .1097 ** -.0865 * .1472
(.0253) (.0351) (.0353) (.0472) (.0486) (.0937)
10 vs 0 yrs Tenure .0623 -.0166 .0334 .1919 *** -.1875 ** .2795 **
(.0416) (.0639) (.0626) (.0737) (.0934) (.1363)
5 vs 0 yrs Experience .2298 *** .2321 *** .2974 *** .0978 * .0743 .1784 **
(.0322) (.0607) (.0484) (.0522) (.2748) (.0890)
10 vs 0 yrs Experience .4013 *** .4058 *** .5648 *** .1627 * .1414 .3331 *
(.0553) (.1140) (.0962) (.0899) (.5486) (.1744)
20 vs 0 yrs Experience .5696 *** .5779 *** 1.0091 *** .1939 .2544 .5710
(.0755) (.2038) (.2021) (.1239) (1.0973) (.3579)
 
Notes:   
(a) See Notes below Table 3. 
(b) The underlying regression models follow the specification in Table 2, where we use 
second instead of third order polynomials in tenure and experience in order to avoid 
overfitting. 
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  28
Table 5  Predicted Returns to Tenure and Experience in East and West Germany with 
  Alternative  Estimators  –  Sample of Individuals born after 1969 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS AS Topel OLS AS Topel
5 vs 0 yrs Tenure .0963 *** .0279 .0827 * .1034 * -.1116 .0598
(.0284) (.0401) (.0430) (.0560) (.0763) (.0670)
10 vs 0 yrs Tenure .1561 ** .0611 .1216 .1344 ** -.1589 .1520
(.0348) (.0753) (.0840) (.0667) (.1378) (.1702)
5 vs 0 yrs Experience .2142 *** .2251 *** .1891 *** -.0381 .1474 * .0212
(.0408) (.0549) (.0672) (.1039) (.0843) (.1390)
10 vs 0 yrs Experience .3366 *** .3665 *** .3229 ** .0315 .2800 ** .1220
(.0559) (.0955) (.1376) (.1422) (.1307) (.2888)
20 vs 0 yrs Experience .3058 *** .3984 ** .4247 .4941 *** .5012 ** .5621
(.0693) (.1916) (.3282) (.1412) (.2277) (.7282)
West Germany East Germany
 
Notes:   
(a) See Notes below Table 3. 
(b) The underlying regression models follow the specification in Table 2, where we use 
second instead of third order polynomials in tenure and experience in order to avoid 
overfitting. 
(c) The OLS and AS returns were predicted based on regressions with 2069 person-year 
observations for West and 534 person-year observations for the East German sample. The 
first step of the Topel estimator used 1752 and 448 observations, the second step is based on 
2069 and 534 observations in East and West Germany, respectively.  
 
Source: Germany Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006), own calculations.  29
Appendix  
Table A1: Estimation Results of the Topel estimator for West Germany 
 
Topel estimation (1st step) Topel estimation (2nd step)
Δtenure/10 .5775 *** initial exper./10 .4634 ***
.1080 .0486
Δtenure²/100 .0088 initial exper.²/100 -.0283
.0479 .0404
Δtenure³/1000 .0020 initial exper.³/1000 .0021
.0101 .0089
Δexper.²/100 -.0877 educ_intermediate .1843 ***
.0587 .0183
Δexper.³/1000 .0071 educ_upper sec. .3848 ***
.0091 .0263
Δeduc_Sec.School -.0911 educ_university .5879 ***
.1049 .0197
Δeduc_intermed. -.1958 * educ_other/missings -.0011
.1068 .0279
Δeduc_upper sec. -.1854 state_Schleswig-Hols. -.0848 **
.4702 .0386
Δeduc_university -.0755 state_Hamburg -.0618
.1064 .0598
Δeduc_other -.0974 state_Lower Saxony -.0249
.0940 .0265
Δstate_Schleswig-H. .1251 state_Bremen -.0366
.0803 .0794
Δstate_Hamburg -.0294 state_N-Rhein-Westfa. -.0303
.0523 .0206
Δstate_Lower Saxony -.0816 state_Hessen -.0110
.0889 .0267
Δstate_Bremen .1827 *** state_R-Pfalz,Saarl. -.0199
.0049 .0259
Δstate_N-Rhein-Westfa .1720 state_Baden-Wuertt. .0655 ***
.1982 .0216
Δstate_Hessen -.0175 Born in Germany .0753 ***
.0534 .0214
Δstate_R-Pfalz,Saarl. -.1984 ind_Not Applicable -.3294 ***
.2089 .0869
Δstate_Baden-Wuertt. -.0556 *** ind_Agriculture -.1036 ***
.0176 .0357
Δstate_Bavaria -.0836 ind_Mining .0167
.0569 .0199
Δind_Not Applicable -.2604 * ind_Manufacturing -.0674 ***
.1542 .0211
Δind_Agriculture -.0552 ind_Construction -.1140 ***
.0510 .0219
Δind_Energy -.0327 ind_Trade -.0313
.0343 .0256
Δind_Mining .0162 ind_Transport .0334
.0264 .0274
Δind_Manufacturing -.0755 * ind_Bank,Insurance .0013
.0453 .0427
Δind_Construction .0065 ind_Services -.0573 **
.0402 .0276
Δind_Trade -.0773 * ind_Other -.0629
.0415 .0938
Δind_Transport .0287 ind_Missing -.0504 *
.0443 .0300
Δind_Bank,Ins. -.0399 y2003 .0319 ***
.0324 .0068
Δind_Services -.0114 y2004 .0339 ***
.0499 .0078
Δind_Other .0712 y2005 .0325 ***
.0930 .0092




The results are based on 10 multiply imputed datasets for West Germany. The first step 
estimation uses 9300 and the second step 10087 observations.  CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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